{ "schemaVersion": 1, "path": "/research/source-kit", "canonicalUrl": "https://grizzlybulls.com/research/source-kit", "publishedAt": "2026-09-12", "updatedAt": null, "lastChangedAt": "2026-09-14", "author": { "name": "Lee Bailey", "path": "/lee-bailey", "role": "Founder and researcher, Grizzly Bulls", "description": "Software engineer, market researcher, author, and founder of Grizzly Bulls." }, "standardsUrl": "https://grizzlybulls.com/research/standards", "contactUrl": "https://grizzlybulls.com/contact#research-press", "downloads": { "json": "https://grizzlybulls.com/research-data/grizzly-bulls-research-source-kit.json", "csv": "https://grizzlybulls.com/research-data/grizzly-bulls-research-source-kit.csv" }, "reuseGuidance": [ "Public Grizzly Bulls research pages and factual findings may be cited without permission.", "When reusing a measured statistic, preserve the study data snapshot date and any material limitation that changes interpretation.", "Public aggregate CSV and JSON downloads may be used for verification, analysis, and new charts with attribution to Grizzly Bulls and the canonical study.", "The source kit helps readers discover and reuse published studies. The full study remains the reference for source scope, dates, methodology, limitations, and third-party reuse restrictions." ], "studies": [ { "slug": "billionaire-public-equity-ownership-census", "path": "/research/billionaire-public-equity-ownership-census", "canonicalUrl": "https://grizzlybulls.com/research/billionaire-public-equity-ownership-census", "title": "Billionaire Public-Equity Ownership Census", "collectionId": "ownership-holdings", "collectionTitle": "Ownership & Holdings", "studyType": "Evidence coverage census", "question": "How much of the billionaire universe can reviewed SEC ownership evidence actually support?", "keyResult": "19.3% had reviewed SEC position evidence; source reach was the first blocker for 77.5%.", "reviewedUniverse": "2,549 billionaire profiles", "primarySourceFamily": "SEC Forms 3/4/5 and Schedule 13 evidence", "publishedAt": "2026-09-08", "updatedAt": "2026-09-10", "dataAsOf": "2026-09-06", "version": "1.0", "citation": "Lee Bailey. “Billionaire Public-Equity Ownership Census: What SEC Filings Can Actually Prove About Billionaire Stock Ownership.” Grizzly Bulls, September 8, 2026. Version 1.0. Data snapshot September 6, 2026. https://grizzlybulls.com/research/billionaire-public-equity-ownership-census", "downloads": { "csv": "https://grizzlybulls.com/research-data/billionaire-public-equity-ownership-census-2026-09-06.csv", "json": "https://grizzlybulls.com/research-data/billionaire-public-equity-ownership-census-2026-09-06.json" } }, { "slug": "jensen-huang-nvidia-ownership", "path": "/research/jensen-huang-nvidia-ownership", "canonicalUrl": "https://grizzlybulls.com/research/jensen-huang-nvidia-ownership", "title": "Jensen Huang NVIDIA Ownership Snapshot", "collectionId": "ownership-holdings", "collectionTitle": "Ownership & Holdings", "studyType": "Dated ownership snapshot", "question": "What did Jensen Huang's June 17 NVIDIA filing report, and what changes when that dated position is valued later?", "keyResult": "812,004,746 NVIDIA shares were reported in the June 17 relationship; 91.4% were held indirectly.", "reviewedUniverse": "1 person-company ownership relationship", "primarySourceFamily": "SEC Form 4 plus dated market-price evidence", "publishedAt": "2026-09-09", "updatedAt": "2026-09-10", "dataAsOf": "2026-09-04", "version": "1.0", "citation": "Lee Bailey. “Jensen Huang NVIDIA Ownership Snapshot: What the June 17 Form 4 Reported, and What $187 Billion at a September Price Does Not Mean.” Grizzly Bulls, September 9, 2026. Version 1.0. Data snapshot September 4, 2026. https://grizzlybulls.com/research/jensen-huang-nvidia-ownership", "downloads": { "csv": "https://grizzlybulls.com/research-data/jensen-huang-nvidia-ownership-2026-09-04.csv", "json": "https://grizzlybulls.com/research-data/jensen-huang-nvidia-ownership-2026-09-04.json" } }, { "slug": "billionaire-public-equity-positions", "path": "/research/billionaire-public-equity-positions", "canonicalUrl": "https://grizzlybulls.com/research/billionaire-public-equity-positions", "title": "Billionaire Public-Equity Positions Dataset", "collectionId": "ownership-holdings", "collectionTitle": "Ownership & Holdings", "studyType": "Cross-company ownership dataset", "question": "What reviewed billionaire public-equity relationships can be published without flattening unlike securities and filing scopes?", "keyResult": "13 reviewed relationships preserve legal security classes, ownership form, exclusions, evidence scope, and observation dates.", "reviewedUniverse": "13 relationships · 12 profiles · 12 companies", "primarySourceFamily": "SEC Forms 3/4, Schedule 13, and reviewed ownership evidence", "publishedAt": "2026-09-10", "updatedAt": "2026-09-10", "dataAsOf": "2026-09-06", "version": "1.0", "citation": "Lee Bailey. “Billionaire Public-Equity Positions Dataset: 13 Reviewed SEC Ownership Relationships Across 12 Billionaire Profiles and 12 Companies.” Grizzly Bulls, September 10, 2026. Version 1.0. Data snapshot September 6, 2026. https://grizzlybulls.com/research/billionaire-public-equity-positions", "downloads": { "csv": "https://grizzlybulls.com/research-data/billionaire-public-equity-positions-2026-09-06.csv", "json": "https://grizzlybulls.com/research-data/billionaire-public-equity-positions-2026-09-06.json" } }, { "slug": "billionaire-voting-power", "path": "/research/billionaire-voting-power", "canonicalUrl": "https://grizzlybulls.com/research/billionaire-voting-power", "title": "Billionaire Voting Power: Meta, Alphabet and Berkshire Compared", "collectionId": "voting-governance", "collectionTitle": "Voting Power & Governance", "studyType": "Voting-power comparison", "question": "How much total company voting power did three prominent billionaires hold at their reviewed SEC observation dates?", "keyResult": "The highest reviewed observation was 60.8% of total company voting power; 1 observation exceeded 50%.", "reviewedUniverse": "3 person-company voting observations", "primarySourceFamily": "Issuer proxy and SEC ownership disclosures", "publishedAt": "2026-09-10", "updatedAt": null, "dataAsOf": "2026-07-14", "version": "1.0", "citation": "Lee Bailey. “Billionaire Voting Power: Meta, Alphabet and Berkshire Compared: A 2026 SEC Comparison of Mark Zuckerberg, Sergey Brin and Warren Buffett.” Grizzly Bulls, September 10, 2026. Version 1.0. Data snapshot July 14, 2026. https://grizzlybulls.com/research/billionaire-voting-power", "downloads": { "csv": "https://grizzlybulls.com/research-data/billionaire-voting-power-2026-07-14.csv", "json": "https://grizzlybulls.com/research-data/billionaire-voting-power-2026-07-14.json" } }, { "slug": "founder-voting-control", "path": "/research/founder-voting-control", "canonicalUrl": "https://grizzlybulls.com/research/founder-voting-control", "title": "Founder Voting Control at 10 Public Companies", "collectionId": "voting-governance", "collectionTitle": "Voting Power & Governance", "studyType": "Founder-control cohort", "question": "How much total company voting power did founders hold across 10 selected public companies, and which mechanisms created it?", "keyResult": "4 of 10 reviewed founders exceeded 50% of total voting power; the highest observation was 82.4%.", "reviewedUniverse": "10 selected public companies", "primarySourceFamily": "Issuer proxy, voting, and governance disclosures", "publishedAt": "2026-09-10", "updatedAt": null, "dataAsOf": "2026-07-31", "version": "1.0", "citation": "Lee Bailey. “Founder Voting Control at 10 Public Companies: How SEC Disclosures Show 27.4% to 82.4% Founder Voting Power, and Why the Mechanism Matters.” Grizzly Bulls, September 10, 2026. Version 1.0. Data snapshot July 31, 2026. https://grizzlybulls.com/research/founder-voting-control", "downloads": { "csv": "https://grizzlybulls.com/research-data/founder-voting-control-2026-07-31.csv", "json": "https://grizzlybulls.com/research-data/founder-voting-control-2026-07-31.json" } }, { "slug": "founder-voting-control-change", "path": "/research/founder-voting-control-change", "canonicalUrl": "https://grizzlybulls.com/research/founder-voting-control-change", "title": "How Founder Voting Control Changed at 10 Public Companies", "collectionId": "voting-governance", "collectionTitle": "Voting Power & Governance", "studyType": "Longitudinal disclosure comparison", "question": "How did founder voting power change between two comparable issuer disclosures for the same 10-company cohort?", "keyResult": "5 increased, 4 decreased, and 1 was unchanged; the study does not assign transaction causes.", "reviewedUniverse": "10 founder-company pairs with two reviewed endpoints", "primarySourceFamily": "Paired issuer voting-power disclosures", "publishedAt": "2026-09-10", "updatedAt": null, "dataAsOf": "2026-07-31", "version": "1.0", "citation": "Lee Bailey. “How Founder Voting Control Changed at 10 Public Companies: Five Founders Gained Voting Power, Four Lost It, and One Was Unchanged Across Reviewed SEC Disclosures.” Grizzly Bulls, September 10, 2026. Version 1.0. Data snapshot July 31, 2026. https://grizzlybulls.com/research/founder-voting-control-change", "downloads": { "csv": "https://grizzlybulls.com/research-data/founder-voting-control-change-2026-07-31.csv", "json": "https://grizzlybulls.com/research-data/founder-voting-control-change-2026-07-31.json" } }, { "slug": "founder-supervoting-sunsets", "path": "/research/founder-supervoting-sunsets", "canonicalUrl": "https://grizzlybulls.com/research/founder-supervoting-sunsets", "title": "When Founder Supervoting Rights End at 10 Public Companies", "collectionId": "voting-governance", "collectionTitle": "Voting Power & Governance", "studyType": "Governance mechanics study", "question": "When do enhanced founder voting rights convert or end across the selected 10-company cohort?", "keyResult": "2 of 10 reviewed companies have a hard time-based companywide sunset; other mechanisms depend on events, thresholds, transfers, or holder votes.", "reviewedUniverse": "10 founder-control structures", "primarySourceFamily": "SEC-hosted charters and issuer governance disclosures", "publishedAt": "2026-09-11", "updatedAt": null, "dataAsOf": "2026-08-26", "version": "1.0", "citation": "Lee Bailey. “When Founder Supervoting Rights End at 10 Public Companies: Only Two Reviewed Companies Have a Hard Time-Based Companywide Sunset; the Rest Depend on Founder Events, Thresholds, Transfers or Holder Votes.” Grizzly Bulls, September 11, 2026. Version 1.0. Data snapshot August 26, 2026. https://grizzlybulls.com/research/founder-supervoting-sunsets", "downloads": { "csv": "https://grizzlybulls.com/research-data/founder-supervoting-sunsets-2026-08-26.csv", "json": "https://grizzlybulls.com/research-data/founder-supervoting-sunsets-2026-08-26.json" } }, { "slug": "founder-voting-vs-ownership", "path": "/research/founder-voting-vs-ownership", "canonicalUrl": "https://grizzlybulls.com/research/founder-voting-vs-ownership", "title": "Founder Voting Power vs Share Ownership at 9 Public Companies", "collectionId": "voting-governance", "collectionTitle": "Voting Power & Governance", "studyType": "Matched-denominator study", "question": "How does founder total voting power compare with issuer-disclosed share-count ownership when the same disclosure supports both?", "keyResult": "9 of 9 matched founders had voting power above disclosed share-count ownership; Alphabet remains explicitly unmatched.", "reviewedUniverse": "9 matched companies · 1 source-coverage exclusion", "primarySourceFamily": "Issuer proxy and principal-holder ownership disclosures", "publishedAt": "2026-09-11", "updatedAt": null, "dataAsOf": "2026-08-26", "version": "1.0", "citation": "Lee Bailey. “Founder Voting Power vs Share Ownership at 9 Public Companies: All Nine Matched Founders Had More Voting Power Than Their Disclosed Share-Count Ownership.” Grizzly Bulls, September 11, 2026. Version 1.0. Data snapshot August 26, 2026. https://grizzlybulls.com/research/founder-voting-vs-ownership", "downloads": { "csv": "https://grizzlybulls.com/research-data/founder-voting-vs-ownership-2026-08-26.csv", "json": "https://grizzlybulls.com/research-data/founder-voting-vs-ownership-2026-08-26.json" } }, { "slug": "sec-ownership-evidence", "path": "/research/sec-ownership-evidence", "canonicalUrl": "https://grizzlybulls.com/research/sec-ownership-evidence", "title": "SEC Filing Evidence for Billionaire Stock Ownership", "collectionId": "sec-evidence-methodology", "collectionTitle": "SEC Evidence & Methodology", "studyType": "Evidence methodology study", "question": "What can the SEC source families behind the reviewed billionaire ownership dataset actually establish?", "keyResult": "6 source patterns appear across 13 relationships; 4 relationships use multiple source families.", "reviewedUniverse": "13 reviewed ownership relationships", "primarySourceFamily": "Forms 3/4, Schedule 13, proxy / Item 403, and filing-history metadata", "publishedAt": "2026-09-11", "updatedAt": null, "dataAsOf": "2026-09-06", "version": "1.0", "citation": "Lee Bailey. “SEC Filing Evidence for Billionaire Stock Ownership: 13 Reviewed Ownership Relationships Required Six Different Evidence Patterns; No Single Filing Type Meant the Same Thing.” Grizzly Bulls, September 11, 2026. Version 1.0. Data snapshot September 6, 2026. https://grizzlybulls.com/research/sec-ownership-evidence", "downloads": { "csv": "https://grizzlybulls.com/research-data/sec-ownership-evidence-2026-09-06.csv", "json": "https://grizzlybulls.com/research-data/sec-ownership-evidence-2026-09-06.json" } }, { "slug": "historical-market-cap-share-count-lag", "path": "/research/historical-market-cap-share-count-lag", "canonicalUrl": "https://grizzlybulls.com/research/historical-market-cap-share-count-lag", "title": "Historical Market Cap: SEC Share-Count Disclosure Lag Across 21 Companies", "collectionId": "valuation-market-data", "collectionTitle": "Valuation & Market Data", "studyType": "Point-in-time valuation-methodology study", "question": "How long after a share count's stated as-of date did the SEC filing make that count public across 21 reviewed companies?", "keyResult": "The median disclosure lag was 6 calendar days; 5 of 21 observations (23.8%) were at least 10 days, with a 17-day maximum.", "reviewedUniverse": "21 reviewed U.S. public-company share-count observations", "primarySourceFamily": "SEC Forms 10-Q and 10-K", "publishedAt": "2026-09-11", "updatedAt": null, "dataAsOf": "2026-09-02", "version": "1.0", "citation": "Lee Bailey. “Historical Market Cap: SEC Share-Count Disclosure Lag Across 21 Companies: A Median 6-Day Gap Separated the Share Date From the Filing Date, a Point-in-Time Trap for Backtests.” Grizzly Bulls, September 11, 2026. Version 1.0. Data snapshot September 2, 2026. https://grizzlybulls.com/research/historical-market-cap-share-count-lag", "downloads": { "csv": "https://grizzlybulls.com/research-data/historical-market-cap-share-count-lag-2026-09-02.csv", "json": "https://grizzlybulls.com/research-data/historical-market-cap-share-count-lag-2026-09-02.json" } }, { "slug": "share-count-disclosure-cadence", "path": "/research/share-count-disclosure-cadence", "canonicalUrl": "https://grizzlybulls.com/research/share-count-disclosure-cadence", "title": "SEC Share-Count Disclosure Cadence Across 16 Filings", "collectionId": "valuation-market-data", "collectionTitle": "Valuation & Market Data", "studyType": "Longitudinal point-in-time methodology study", "question": "Do share-count disclosure lags persist within the same issuer across repeated SEC filings?", "keyResult": "Four of five reviewed issuers stayed within a one-day lag band; 13 of 16 observations (81.3%) were disclosed in 5–7 days, while Netflix ranged from 17 to 23 days.", "reviewedUniverse": "16 reviewed observations across 5 issuers", "primarySourceFamily": "Repeated SEC Forms 10-Q and 10-K", "publishedAt": "2026-09-11", "updatedAt": null, "dataAsOf": "2026-05-20", "version": "1.0", "citation": "Lee Bailey. “SEC Share-Count Disclosure Cadence Across 16 Filings: Four of Five Reviewed Issuers Stayed Within a 1-Day Lag Band, While Netflix Repeatedly Took 17–23 Days.” Grizzly Bulls, September 11, 2026. Version 1.0. Data snapshot May 20, 2026. https://grizzlybulls.com/research/share-count-disclosure-cadence", "downloads": { "csv": "https://grizzlybulls.com/research-data/share-count-disclosure-cadence-2026-05-20.csv", "json": "https://grizzlybulls.com/research-data/share-count-disclosure-cadence-2026-05-20.json" } }, { "slug": "enterprise-value-financing-scope", "path": "/research/enterprise-value-financing-scope", "canonicalUrl": "https://grizzlybulls.com/research/enterprise-value-financing-scope", "title": "Enterprise Value Financing Scope Across 9 Reviewed Companies", "collectionId": "valuation-market-data", "collectionTitle": "Valuation & Market Data", "studyType": "Capital-structure methodology study", "question": "How often is complete reviewed net-debt evidence still insufficient for the bounded enterprise-value calculation?", "keyResult": "3 of 9 reviewed companies had EV withheld despite complete net-debt review: 2 for noncontrolling interests and 1 for preferred equity; 6 were compatible.", "reviewedUniverse": "9 reviewed companies with complete current net-debt evidence", "primarySourceFamily": "Issuer Forms 10-Q and 10-K financing and balance-sheet disclosures", "publishedAt": "2026-09-11", "updatedAt": null, "dataAsOf": "2026-09-02", "version": "1.0", "citation": "Lee Bailey. “Enterprise Value Financing Scope Across 9 Reviewed Companies: 3 of 9 Had Enterprise Value Withheld Even After Complete Net-Debt Review.” Grizzly Bulls, September 11, 2026. Version 1.0. Data snapshot September 2, 2026. https://grizzlybulls.com/research/enterprise-value-financing-scope", "downloads": { "csv": "https://grizzlybulls.com/research-data/enterprise-value-financing-scope-2026-09-02.csv", "json": "https://grizzlybulls.com/research-data/enterprise-value-financing-scope-2026-09-02.json" } }, { "slug": "sec-companyfacts-normalization-coverage", "path": "/research/sec-companyfacts-normalization-coverage", "canonicalUrl": "https://grizzlybulls.com/research/sec-companyfacts-normalization-coverage", "title": "SEC Companyfacts Annual Financial Coverage Across 61 Companies", "collectionId": "valuation-market-data", "collectionTitle": "Valuation & Market Data", "studyType": "Financial-statement source coverage study", "question": "How much of a 61-company market universe could strict SEC Companyfacts annual normalization cover without generic IFRS mapping, implicit FX conversion, or inferred issuer identity?", "keyResult": "59 of 61 companies (96.7%) normalized under the reviewed 13-metric annual-financials schema; the two remaining cases stopped at a CAD currency-unit boundary and an unresolved issuer-identity boundary.", "reviewedUniverse": "61 configured market companies in the September 3, 2026 measurement", "primarySourceFamily": "SEC Companyfacts annual US-GAAP facts and reviewed issuer identity", "publishedAt": "2026-09-12", "updatedAt": null, "dataAsOf": "2026-09-03", "version": "1.0", "citation": "Lee Bailey. “SEC Companyfacts Annual Financial Coverage Across 61 Companies: 59 of 61 Normalized Under Strict Reviewed Rules; the Remaining Gaps Were Currency and Identity.” Grizzly Bulls, September 12, 2026. Version 1.0. Data snapshot September 3, 2026. https://grizzlybulls.com/research/sec-companyfacts-normalization-coverage", "downloads": { "csv": "https://grizzlybulls.com/research-data/sec-companyfacts-normalization-coverage-2026-09-03.csv", "json": "https://grizzlybulls.com/research-data/sec-companyfacts-normalization-coverage-2026-09-03.json" } }, { "slug": "sec-sale-footnote-review", "path": "/research/sec-sale-footnote-review", "canonicalUrl": "https://grizzlybulls.com/research/sec-sale-footnote-review", "title": "SEC Sale Footnotes Across 48,912 Form 4/5 Candidates", "collectionId": "sec-evidence-methodology", "collectionTitle": "SEC Evidence & Methodology", "studyType": "SEC transaction-evidence methodology study", "question": "How often did Form 4/5 sale candidates require footnote review, and which recurring semantics dominated candidates blocked only by that gate?", "keyResult": "45,879 of 48,912 sale candidates (93.8%) carried a footnote-review blocker; 6,808 of 7,573 footnote-only cases used weighted-average or price-range language.", "reviewedUniverse": "48,912 non-derivative sale candidates across 513 billionaire profiles", "primarySourceFamily": "SEC Forms 4 and 5 non-derivative sale transactions and footnotes", "publishedAt": "2026-09-12", "updatedAt": null, "dataAsOf": "2026-08-31", "version": "1.0", "citation": "Lee Bailey. “SEC Sale Footnotes Across 48,912 Form 4/5 Candidates: 45,879 Sale Candidates Hit a Footnote Review Gate, and Price-Aggregation Language Dominated the Footnote-Only Cases.” Grizzly Bulls, September 12, 2026. Version 1.0. Data snapshot August 31, 2026. https://grizzlybulls.com/research/sec-sale-footnote-review", "downloads": { "csv": "https://grizzlybulls.com/research-data/sec-sale-footnote-review-2026-08-31.csv", "json": "https://grizzlybulls.com/research-data/sec-sale-footnote-review-2026-08-31.json" } }, { "slug": "sec-ownership-evidence-funnel", "path": "/research/sec-ownership-evidence-funnel", "canonicalUrl": "https://grizzlybulls.com/research/sec-ownership-evidence-funnel", "title": "SEC Ownership Evidence Funnel Across 20,834 Form 3/4/5 Candidates", "collectionId": "sec-evidence-methodology", "collectionTitle": "SEC Evidence & Methodology", "studyType": "SEC ownership-extraction methodology study", "question": "What survives when exact SEC identity review and conservative Forms 3/4/5 extraction are applied to a selected group of billionaire profiles?", "keyResult": "1,503 of 20,834 candidates (7.2%) were simple direct non-zero positions; footnote review accounted for 50.6% of candidates.", "reviewedUniverse": "20,834 position candidates across 198 Forms-eligible profiles", "primarySourceFamily": "SEC Forms 3, 4 and 5 ownership filings and conservative position extraction", "publishedAt": "2026-09-12", "updatedAt": null, "dataAsOf": "2026-09-10", "version": "1.0", "citation": "Lee Bailey. “SEC Ownership Evidence Funnel Across 20,834 Form 3/4/5 Candidates: Only 1,503 of 20,834 Extracted Position Candidates Were Simple Direct Non-Zero Positions.” Grizzly Bulls, September 12, 2026. Version 1.0. Data snapshot September 10, 2026. https://grizzlybulls.com/research/sec-ownership-evidence-funnel", "downloads": { "csv": "https://grizzlybulls.com/research-data/sec-ownership-evidence-funnel-2026-09-10.csv", "json": "https://grizzlybulls.com/research-data/sec-ownership-evidence-funnel-2026-09-10.json" } }, { "slug": "yield-curve-recession-signal", "path": "/research/yield-curve-recession-signal", "canonicalUrl": "https://grizzlybulls.com/research/yield-curve-recession-signal", "title": "Yield Curve Recession Signal: Reconstructing the May 2023 Warning", "collectionId": "systematic-markets", "collectionTitle": "Systematic Markets", "studyType": "Forecast reconstruction", "question": "What did the 10-year minus 3-month Treasury spread imply in May 2023 under the maintained New York Fed model, and what was the realized NBER classification twelve months later?", "keyResult": "The May 2023 spread averaged -1.73 percentage points and reconstructs to 71.4% recession probability for May 2024; NBER did not classify that target month as recession as of the study cutoff.", "reviewedUniverse": "22 May 2023 daily T10Y3M observations plus one 12-month target month", "primarySourceFamily": "FRED T10Y3M, New York Fed yield-curve model, and NBER business-cycle chronology", "publishedAt": "2026-09-13", "updatedAt": null, "dataAsOf": "2026-09-12", "version": "1.0", "citation": "Lee Bailey. “Yield Curve Recession Signal: Reconstructing the May 2023 Warning: A -1.73 Percentage-Point Monthly Average Implied 71.4% Recession Probability Twelve Months Ahead; May 2024 Was Not an NBER Recession.” Grizzly Bulls, September 13, 2026. Version 1.0. Data snapshot September 12, 2026. https://grizzlybulls.com/research/yield-curve-recession-signal", "downloads": { "csv": "https://grizzlybulls.com/research-data/yield-curve-recession-signal-2026-09-12.csv", "json": "https://grizzlybulls.com/research-data/yield-curve-recession-signal-2026-09-12.json" } }, { "slug": "sp500-ai-concentration", "path": "/research/sp500-ai-concentration", "canonicalUrl": "https://grizzlybulls.com/research/sp500-ai-concentration", "title": "S&P 500 AI Concentration: How Much of the Index Is AI-Linked?", "collectionId": "systematic-markets", "collectionTitle": "Systematic Markets", "studyType": "Index concentration snapshot", "question": "How concentrated was the S&P 500 in September 2026, and how much of its weight sat in a conservative company cohort directly tied to AI infrastructure and cloud-platform investment?", "keyResult": "The top 10 security lines were 38.09% of index weight; the conservative AI-linked cohort was 29.46%, or 77.3% of top-10 weight.", "reviewedUniverse": "10 top security lines · 9 companies · 7-company conservative AI-linked cohort", "primarySourceFamily": "S&P Dow Jones Indices, State Street index holdings, SEC filings, and issuer financial disclosures", "publishedAt": "2026-09-14", "updatedAt": null, "dataAsOf": "2026-09-09", "version": "1.0", "citation": "Lee Bailey. “S&P 500 AI Concentration: How Much of the Index Is AI-Linked?: The Top 10 Security Lines Were 38.09% of the Index; a Conservative Seven-Company AI-Linked Cohort Was 29.46%.” Grizzly Bulls, September 14, 2026. Version 1.0. Data snapshot September 9, 2026. https://grizzlybulls.com/research/sp500-ai-concentration", "downloads": { "csv": "https://grizzlybulls.com/research-data/sp500-ai-concentration-2026-09-09.csv", "json": "https://grizzlybulls.com/research-data/sp500-ai-concentration-2026-09-09.json" } } ] }