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How Founder Voting Control Changed at 10 Public Companies

Five Founders Gained Voting Power, Four Lost It, and One Was Unchanged Across Reviewed SEC Disclosures
By Lee BaileyPublished September 10, 2026Latest included observation July 31, 2026Version 1.010 founder/company pairs
Key findings

Founder voting power rose at five companies, fell at four, and was unchanged at one

Across the same 10-company cohort used in our founder-control study, the median disclosure-to-disclosure change was +0.15 pp. Eric Yuan had the largest increase at +5.9 pp; Tony Xu had the largest decrease at -2.1 pp.

5founders with higher disclosed voting power
Measured in percentage points of total company voting power.
4founders with lower disclosed voting power
No transaction cause is inferred from the change.
1unchanged founder observation
Evan Spiegel remained at 53.1% across the two reviewed Snap disclosures.
These are changes between two issuer disclosures, not changes in economic ownership. Each row preserves its exact observation dates and interval; the changes are not annualized.

How the 10 founder-control observations changed

Rows are ordered by percentage-point change. The bars encode the current share of total company voting power on a common 100% scale; the detail beneath each bar shows the prior value, signed change, and exact observation interval.

Current total voting power, ordered by change

Same denominator throughout: percentage of total company voting power.
Eric Yuan at Zoom Communications37.7%
31.8% on January 31, 2025 → 37.7% on July 31, 2026 · +5.9 pp · 546 days
Drew Houston at Dropbox82.4%
78.48% on March 31, 2025 → 82.4% on March 31, 2026 · +3.92 pp · 365 days
Brian Chesky at Airbnb31.9%
30.5% on April 7, 2025 → 31.9% on April 8, 2026 · +1.4 pp · 366 days
Jack Dorsey at Block42.2%
41.3% on March 31, 2025 → 42.2% on March 31, 2026 · +0.9 pp · 365 days
Larry Page at Alphabet27.4%
27.1% on April 8, 2025 → 27.4% on April 6, 2026 · +0.3 pp · 363 days
Evan Spiegel at Snap53.1%
53.1% on December 31, 2024 → 53.1% on December 31, 2025 · 0.0 pp · 365 days
Tobi Lütke at Shopify40.02%
40.03% on April 7, 2025 → 40.02% on April 21, 2026 · -0.01 pp · 379 days
Mark Zuckerberg at Meta Platforms60.8%
61% on April 1, 2025 → 60.8% on April 1, 2026 · -0.2 pp · 365 days
Brian Armstrong at Coinbase Global49.6%
50.2% on March 31, 2025 → 49.6% on March 31, 2026 · -0.6 pp · 365 days
Tony Xu at DoorDash55.5%
57.6% on March 1, 2025 → 55.5% on March 1, 2026 · -2.1 pp · 365 days
Source: reviewed SEC-hosted issuer disclosures. The chart encodes current level; signed changes are shown in the row details and table below.

Previous and current issuer observations

Founder / companyPreviousCurrentChangeIntervalPrimary evidence
Eric Yuan
Zoom Communications
31.8%
January 31, 2025
37.7%
July 31, 2026
+5.9 pp
increased
546 daysZoom Communications 2025 Form 10-K · Zoom Communications Q2 FY2027 Form 10-Q
The current observation is July 31, 2026, so this disclosure-to-disclosure interval is 546 days rather than one year. The change is not annualized.
Drew Houston
Dropbox
78.48%
March 31, 2025
82.4%
March 31, 2026
+3.92 pp
increased
365 daysDropbox 2025 Proxy Statement · Dropbox 2026 Proxy Statement
Brian Chesky
Airbnb
30.5%
April 7, 2025
31.9%
April 8, 2026
+1.4 pp
increased
366 daysAirbnb 2025 Proxy Statement · Airbnb 2026 Proxy Statement
Jack Dorsey
Block
41.3%
March 31, 2025
42.2%
March 31, 2026
+0.9 pp
increased
365 daysBlock 2025 Proxy Statement · Block 2026 Proxy Statement
Larry Page
Alphabet
27.1%
April 8, 2025
27.4%
April 6, 2026
+0.3 pp
increased
363 daysAlphabet 2025 Proxy Statement · Alphabet 2026 Proxy Statement
Evan Spiegel
Snap
53.1%
December 31, 2024
53.1%
December 31, 2025
0.0 pp
unchanged
365 daysSnap 2024 Form 10-K · Snap 2025 Form 10-K
Tobi Lütke
Shopify
40.03%
April 7, 2025
40.02%
April 21, 2026
-0.01 pp
decreased
379 daysShopify 2025 Management Information Circular · Shopify 2026 Management Information Circular
Shopify's single Founder Share carries a variable number of votes. The comparison uses the issuer-reported aggregate voting-power percentage at each observation date rather than assigning the Founder Share a fixed vote multiplier.
Mark Zuckerberg
Meta Platforms
61%
April 1, 2025
60.8%
April 1, 2026
-0.2 pp
decreased
365 daysMeta Platforms 2025 Proxy Statement · Meta Platforms 2026 Proxy Statement
Brian Armstrong
Coinbase Global
50.2%
March 31, 2025
49.6%
March 31, 2026
-0.6 pp
decreased
365 daysCoinbase Global 2025 Proxy Statement · Coinbase Global 2026 Proxy Statement
The individual Brian Armstrong row is compared across both periods; separately disclosed trusts with an independent trustee are not added to his individual voting-power percentage.
Tony Xu
DoorDash
57.6%
March 1, 2025
55.5%
March 1, 2026
-2.1 pp
decreased
365 daysDoorDash 2025 Proxy Statement · DoorDash 2026 Proxy Statement
Both observations use DoorDash's issuer-reported total voting authority for Tony Xu, including shares subject to irrevocable voting proxies from co-founders. The issuer-reported voting-authority percentage is not a beneficial-ownership percentage.

Three rows that need extra context

DoorDash: proxy authority stays in the denominator

Both observations use DoorDash's issuer-reported total voting authority for Tony Xu, including shares subject to irrevocable voting proxies from co-founders. The issuer-reported voting-authority percentage is not a beneficial-ownership percentage.

Shopify: the Founder Share is variable

Shopify's single Founder Share carries a variable number of votes. The comparison uses the issuer-reported aggregate voting-power percentage at each observation date rather than assigning the Founder Share a fixed vote multiplier.

What the changes support—and what they do not

Supported conclusions
  • 5 of 10 founder observations increased, 4 decreased, and 1 was unchanged.
  • The observed changes range from -2.1 pp to +5.9 pp.
  • The cohort median change is +0.15 pp.
  • Each comparison uses total company voting power on both endpoints and retains the issuer-specific control mechanism.
Unsupported inferences
  • The selected cohort is not evidence for the typical public company or founder.
  • A higher percentage does not by itself prove a founder bought shares; a lower percentage does not by itself prove a founder sold shares.
  • Voting-power change is not economic-ownership change, market-value change, or net-worth change.
  • The mixed observation intervals should not be compared as annual growth rates.

Methodology

  1. Use the same reviewed 10-company founder cohort as the founder voting-control study.
  2. For each founder/company pair, locate the closest earlier issuer disclosure that reports the same total-company-voting-power denominator with comparable founder/control semantics.
  3. Compute percentage-point change as current voting power minus previous voting power. Do not compute a percent-growth rate from percentages.
  4. Preserve both observation dates and the exact day interval. Do not annualize rows whose intervals differ.
  5. Keep special control mechanisms attached to the figures, including DoorDash proxy authority and Shopify's variable-vote Founder Share.
  6. Use the same reviewed current endpoint as the parent founder-control study so the two publications remain directly comparable.

For each row, the prior observation is the closest earlier issuer disclosure we found with a comparable total-voting-power denominator and founder/control definition.

Limitations

  • This is the same selected 10-company cohort as the current founder voting-control study version 1.0, not a representative sample of public companies.
  • The study measures change in issuer-disclosed total company voting power, not change in economic ownership, beneficial ownership, market value, or net worth.
  • A voting-power percentage can change because of founder holdings, conversions, voting agreements, proxy authority, issuer share-count changes, or other denominator effects. This study does not assign a cause unless a source explicitly supports one.
  • Observation intervals are preserved per row and are not all exactly one year; the percentage-point changes are not annualized.
  • DoorDash's voting-authority total includes irrevocable proxy authority and Shopify's Founder Share has variable votes, so those mechanisms must remain attached to the comparison.

Primary SEC sources

Each row has an earlier quantitative source plus the reviewed current source used in the founder-control study. Context-only current sources remain labeled rather than being mistaken for quantitative endpoints.

Download the reviewed comparison

CSV and JSON include both endpoint values and dates, signed percentage-point changes, interval lengths, control mechanisms, comparability notes, canonical profile links where available, and primary-source URLs.

Citation and reuse

When citing a change, preserve both observation dates and describe it as a percentage-point change in disclosed total voting power—not a percentage change in ownership.

Lee Bailey. “How Founder Voting Control Changed at 10 Public Companies: Five Founders Gained Voting Power, Four Lost It, and One Was Unchanged Across Reviewed SEC Disclosures.” Grizzly Bulls, September 10, 2026. Version 1.0. Data snapshot July 31, 2026. https://grizzlybulls.com/research/founder-voting-control-change

For DoorDash, keep the irrevocable-proxy voting-authority semantics. For Shopify, keep the variable Founder Share. For Zoom, note that the comparison interval is 546 days and is not annualized.